The DPJ’s heavy defeat in the July 11 Upper House election, less than a year after the party’s historic victory, appears to have thrown up the danger of political gridlock when Japan looks least able to afford it.

Barely a month after Naoto Kan revitalized the government’s standing in the polls, the new leader appeared to commit electoral suicide by talking about a consumption-tax rise that is almost identical to LDP policy, and which a majority of the electorate sees as inevitable and necessary.

The day after the election, two veteran political analysts, Gerald Curtis and Rei Shiratori, came to the FCCJ to give their perspective on what all it means for the country.

According to Shiratori, president of the Institute for Political Studies in Japan, Kan misjudged the consumption-tax issue, thinking it would unite the DPJ and take voters’ minds off the Futenma problem and the Ozawa/Hatoyama money/leadership issues.

Shiratori says the current situation in the Diet throws up the real possibility of a DPJ-LDP grand coalition. “Kan has rejected all his coalition partners. The only possible partner now is the LDP… this process of dealignment and realignment has been going on since 1993.”

Pointing out that the LDP formed a coalition with the Socialists “in one night” in 1994, Shiratori suggested it could be easier between the LDP and the DPJ as, “There is no fundamental ideological difference between the two main parties.”

Curtis, who has taught political science at both Columbia and Waseda universities, predicted there would be no coalition, and that the opposition parties are set to now give Kan a hard time by, “not agreeing on anything. I think that’s what you’re likely to see … true gridlock and policy paralysis.”

“No opposition party is going to join this government,” Curtis said. “The DPJ did so badly that politicians in the other parties are inclined to believe this party is in decline – no one is going to join this sinking ship.”

Describing the election result as a loss for the DPJ rather than a show of support for the opposition, Curtis warned: “The danger is the LDP will think they won. You’ll see less pressure to modernize the party and bring in new leadership, because its leaders will be able to claim victory.”

Switching back to the DPJ, he predicted that, “Kan most likely will survive the tense intraparty fight that’s now going to unfold. Mr. Ozawa will, I imagine, try to drive him out but he’s not in that strong a position himself. He’s still very unpopular with the public and doesn’t have a candidate to run. So Kan will survive… but in a very weak position, he’ll be desperate to get some things done by compromising with the opposition. The more he does that, the more he’ll appear to voters as someone who doesn’t have the courage of his own convictions and doesn’t know how to lead.”

Suggesting it was “kind of obvious to an American observer of politics,” what Kan has to do, according to Curtis, is, “go talk to the public, explain his vision and his policies to the country: persuade. The power of persuasion is what political leadership is all about. But I don’t think he’s demonstrated that – somewhat to my surprise, frankly – certainly not the way he’s talked about the consumption tax.”

Shiratori postulated that, “The Japanese have become single-issue voters, considering just one single issue, which this time was the consumption tax. I’m concerned whether we can establish a mature democracy in this situation.”

A lack of strong leadership is due to a lack of suitable politicians, not a lack of desire for such leaders from the electorate, believes Curtis, who pointed to the example of Koizumi, saying, “It’s not that his policies were popular, postal reform actually wasn’t that popular, but they believed in him.”

“I’m more concerned with the difficulty in establishing responsible democratic government,” remarked Shiratori, “The parties are currently little more than ad-hoc organizations to win elections; either the LDP or the DPJ could split within three months.”

The prospect of realignment along policy lines is “very unlikely, almost impossible,” according to Curtis. “The reason is, you could divide up politicians into small government/large government, but you can’t divide the Japanese public that way.

“Everybody really likes the idea of governments that don’t take much in the way of taxation but spend a lot on social welfare. That’s why there’s such a large budget deficit... why Mina-no-to (Your Party) will never become a major party.”

The lack of focus on the intricacies of policy is down to campaign laws and the media, believes Curtis.

“I wrote a book about Japanese elections 40 years ago and the approach to campaigning hasn’t changed: turn up the loudspeakers on the trucks and go around saying ‘I’m Hiro Tanaka, please vote for me.’ Why do they do this? Because the election law is so restrictive as to what can be done and what printed materials can be handed out, there’s no choice.”

Emphasizing the role of the press, Curtis suggested, “in some ways it seems the media in Japan has been the least changed, still the most stuck in the embrace of the factional politics approach of the LDP. The political reporters, particularly on TV, seem determined to put everything in terms of factional conflict, gossip is news, look for anything that can be speculated about into creating political crisis and very little attention to policy issues.”

“And as long as that goes on you won’t have a considered analysis of the problems the country faces,” said Shiratori. “You’ll have weak, unstable government and as the world turns very fast, Japan will turn very slowly.

“And yet there’s no sense of crisis,” he concluded, “People don’t feel that it’s so bad yet, or they would do try and do something.” ❶

Gavin Blair contributes news stories (predominantly business features) to newspapers, websites and magazines in the U.K., U.S., Hong Kong, Ireland and Japan.