Issue:
January 2025
Eric Johnston
For Japanese domestic politics, the key to 2025 is the proverb, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend."
With the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito no longer holding a Lower House majority, and with the LDP divided between the enemies of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba (especially those who were close to former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe) and the rest of the party, the age of instability in Japanese politics, which began last year, will continue. Divisions within each party and among the ruling and opposition parties will sharpen throughout the year, as all sides seek new allies among their old rivals in the hope of taking power.
The Japanese public will voice their opinion on all of this jostling in July's Upper House election. A harsh verdict that reduces LDP seats seems certain, although whether that means more, or less, political stability is anyone's guess.
Andy Sharp
The likely rise of progressive firebrand Lee Jae-myung to South Korea’s presidency after the impeachment of Yoon Suk Yeol has led yawning sceptics to say ties with Japan will go back to their usual state of mutual animosity.
After all, Lee has long rallied against Japan’s colonial legacy, forced labor, and “comfort women,” while fiercely asserting Seoul’s claim to Takeshima/Dokdo. Many fear his rhetoric could strain the detente fostered between the two U.S. treaty allies under Yoon and Kishida.
The first motion led by Lee’s opposition Democratic Party cited his foreign policy including overtures toward Tokyo as “weird” and overly deferential. Yet, pragmatism (both for domestic and international audiences) appeared in the final impeachment motion, which omitted references to Japan and emphasized the importance of Seoul’s ties with Washington and Tokyo. But such diplomatic niceties could face a stern test with the return of Donald Trump to the White House.
Trump 2.0 is threatening troop-hosting cost hikes, demands for increased defense spending, and erratic overtures to Kim Jong-un. Tariff threats and pressure on the Federal Reserve to lower rates could send global markets spinning.
But Trump’s return might compel Tokyo and Seoul to draw closer, following the diplomatic gains achieved during the Kishida-Yoon era. Both countries face shared threats from a belligerent North Korea and an aggressive China.
The specter of Trump strong-arming his allies may push the two neighbours to reinforce ties as a bulwark against economic and security uncertainties.
Public sentiment in both countries is also cautiously supportive (don’t forget the strong pop culture ties) of a closer relationship offering a rare window for collaboration.
Lee will be preoccupied with repairing South Korea’s constitutional safeguards after Yoon’s audacious martial law gambit, and so may find common cause with Japan’s politically fragile leadership. Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s minority government is under threat from a resurgent opposition ahead of upper house elections next year, and both nations have incentives to prioritize stability over historical disputes.
Pragmatism could triumph, bolstered by mutual interest in defusing Trump.
Alternatively, a leadership change in Japan to, say, the hawkish Sanae Takaichi might plunge Tokyo-Seoul relations back into the dark days of mutual distrust.
Anthony Rowley
Next year will probably prove to be better – politically, economically and financially – than most people expect, not despite, but because of, the second coming of Donald Trump as U.S. president, and the fact that expectations for 2025 are generally very low.
There has been a pervasive fear throughout much of 2024 of an imminent World War III triggered if not by conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, Israel and Arab nations or over Taiwan, then by a global trade war initiated by Trump and leading to physical confrontation between nations.
All or any of these contingencies look less likely once he is formally installed as president on January 20 – not because Trump is a pacifist by nature or that he is necessarily aware of the dangers of war but because he is widely reputed to be transactional as much as confrontational. Why else would he publish a book entitled The the Deal?”
The chances are that the Trump administration will seek a quid pro quo in any deal the U.S. does with trading or military partners, and that includes potential antagonists China and Russia. This distinguishes it from a less flexible and more ideological Biden administration, which was seemingly willing to tolerate the prospect of military confrontation.
What Trump will demand in return from partner countries remains an open question. It could turn out to be anything from an agreement on access to trade and investment markets or on currencies, the ceding of national territory (or permission to build a Trump hotel in Moscow’s Red Square to Beijing’s Tiananmen Square – that’s not entirely a facetious remark.
Whichever way it goes, the world can breathe a sigh of relief, for the moment at least.
The word tariff has become synonymous with the name Trump but that may prove to be a fallacious connection. It all depends upon the extent to which partners (friends and enemies alike) are prepared to accept the principle of transactionalism and to accept compromise. This applies not only to mutual market access for goods and services but also to currency values.
We no longer live in an age of fixed exchange rates but even “market determined” currency values can be influenced by official intervention and by central bank policy on interest rates. Perhaps we have been too eager to defend the status quo in recent decades and that Trump 2.0 will provoke needed new thinking.
Dylan H. O’Brien
The ongoing Israel-Hamas War has led to a surge in negative stories about Israel in Japan’s media. This level of coverage for Israel has been unprecedented since the 1980s-1990s yudaya bukku (Jewish book) boom of anti-Jewish conspiracy theories. Unfortunately, some of the stories appearing in Japan’s media have equated Israel with Jews more generally and used defamatory and harmful stereotypes about Jews to criticize Israeli policy.
While the final months of 2024 have seen Japanese magazines, newspapers, and television coverage of the war become less frequent, any quick internet search of Israel-related keywords in Japanese opens up troves of negative stories about Israel dating from the past year and two months. While changes in predominantly negative Japanese representations of Israel seem unlikely, there also appears little reason to assume Japan’s diplomatic and economic ties with Israel will change. That is unless there is suddenly a shift in domestic political winds.
Following a rapprochement of Israeli-Japanese bilateral ties by the second administration of late former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo (December 2012 until September 2020), Japanese investment in Israel reached a record 3.5 billion USD in 2018 after a Japanese-Israeli investment deal was signed in 2017. Furthermore, Israel became Japan’s first industrial research and development agreement partner in 2014, a joint cyber-defense agreement was signed in 2017, and Israel’s flagship carrier, El-Al, began direct flights to Narita Airport in 2023.
However, as political scientists studying Japanese diplomacy have long observed, Japan maintains some strategic ambivalence in bilateral ties with Israel, driven by a complex calculus of geopolitical concerns and oil access. Post-Abe, Japan’s successive cabinets and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) have expressed support for Israel’s right to self-defense; they have also been critical of various Israeli policies and, in May this year, voted in favor of supporting full U.N. membership for Palestine. In April 2024, Japan resumed funding the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), a group that Israeli officials assert has systemic issues. Also, in 2024, Japan froze the assets of Israeli settlers involved in violent attacks.
2025 may bring further ambivalence towards Israel from Kasumigaseki and perhaps some loss of support for several reasons. The biggest reason is that the most pro-Israel political faction of the most pro-Israel political party has been left with a greatly diminished stature following the 2024 general election. While bilateral economic and political ties appeared relatively immune to public opinion, the most pro-Israeli wing of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has lost a significant amount of its power. The current LDP prime minister, Shigeru Ishiba, faces sinking approval and has not articulated any distinct foreign policy agenda for the Middle East.
In my recent research interviews with top pro-Israeli NGO leaders, writers, and religious figures in Japan, I have heard a common refrain that it is “too early” to judge whether Prime Minister Ishiba’s administration is pro-Israel. Most pro-Israeli voices hoped the former Abe faction’s Sanae Takaichi would win the LDP race to be Prime Minister. As such, they understood her loss and the general trouncing of the LDP in the 2024 general election as boding ill for Japanese support towards Israel. Conversely, suppose the Ishiba administration was to be a short one and replaced with a Takaichi administration. In that case, there is reason to believe that this could translate into more full-throated support for Israel.
Another possible reason for the change is that since the start of the Israel-Hamas War, numerous left-wing groups and political parties in Japan have endeavored to make the war domestically relevant by impugning Japan’s growing economic and defense ties with Israel, as well as Japan’s entanglement with American foreign policy.
With the recent fall of the Assad regime in Syria, as well as Israel’s military maneuvers in the Golan Heights and swirling rumors in Israeli media about the possible expansion of settlements or even the annexation of parts of the West Bank, further developments in the region may draw outrage in Japan that reawakens negative Japanese coverage and public protest. Yet another unknown is how Israel’s policies on the Gaza, Golan Heights, West Bank, and persecution of the war may change once Donald J. Trump is sworn in as the 47th president of the United States. Events in Japan – notably the 2025 World Expo in Osaka – may also see protests of Israeli participation and presence reignite news media coverage in Japan and connect seemingly distant geopolitics to local lives.
In all likelihood, Japan’s policy towards Israel will likely not change drastically. However, depending on how the hostage situation, humanitarian crisis, and war evolve in 2025, negative stories may again erupt and further damage Israel’s reputation in Japan. Any possible shift in policy will likely turn on whether domestic opinion against Israel is translated into domestic politics. So far, attempts by left-wing parties like Reiwa Shinsengumi or the Communist Party of Japan to tie Japan’s rhetorical support to America’s direct diplomatic and material have failed. What lies ahead for Israel’s representation in the Japanese media will largely be dictated by the events in the Middle East. Whether public opinion on these events moves Japanese policy remains to be seen.
Mark Schreiber
After a huge public outcry, a major general contractor will withdraw its proposal for a factory outlet mall on the grounds of the Ministry of Defense in Ichigaya.
To alleviate Tokyo's tight hotel situation, a Chinese travel agency has already begun converting seven retired Chinese naval destroyers and frigates to hotels, with the aim of providing overnight accommodations for up to 18,000 tourists at moorings along Tokyo Bay. Depending on room class, guests will have a choice of bunk beds or hammocks.
The Shibuya City government announced that after 10 p.m., Shibuya station will close all station exits except for passengers transferring to lines departing from Shibuya. Kyoto said it is considering suspension of all tourist access except to winners of lottery drawings. Meanwhile, JR East announces that the front and rear cars on every third train of the Chuo, Sobu and Yamanote commuter lines, running between 7:30 a.m. and 9:30 a.m., will be reserved for passengers carrying large suitcases or pushing baby strollers.
The Sankei Shimbun, publisher of evening tabloid newspaper Yukan Fuji, will suspend publication of both its print edition and web site on the last day of January. From February 1, it commences Japan's first dissemination of domestic and international news via drones equipped with loudspeakers, which will fly over Otemachi, Ginza, Shinjuku and other business districts.
To commemorate the centennial of the first year of the Showa Period (which began on 25 December 1926), the Diet will proclaim a one-time "Treasure Week," designating an entire week of national holidays extending from Thursday, December 25 to Wednesday, December 31. Other festive activities to be announced by the beginning of September.
